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I. INTRODUCTION 
Who sets the norms for the ways in which American 
public companies are governed? There are, of course, many 
answers to this question: the Delaware Supreme Court, 
influential scholars and other norm entrepreneurs, members 
of Congress through well-intentioned legislation, the New 
York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ through their listing 
standards, the Business Roundtable through its lobbying 
and litigation, institutional investors, and the "market" 
generally. 
Plaintiffs' lawyers, too, have become influential in 
shaping corporate governance norms. Class counsel have 
resolved many derivative suits and shareholder class actions 
in recent years with what are known as "therapeutic" 
settlements.1 These are settlements in which corporate 
defendants agree to restructure their boards, reconfigure 
their governance arrangements, hire additional staff, and 
improve their legal compliance programs.2 Therapeutic 
settlements in private litigation have also included 
provisions for annual, rather than staggered, elections of 
directors; shareholder access to the proxy ballot; and creation 
of the position oflead director. 3 
1 The use of the term "therapeutics" derives from the use of the term 
"corporate therapeutics" in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 
396 (1970) (citing Murphy v. N. Am. Light & Power Co., 33 F. Supp. 567, 
570 (S.D.N.Y 1940)). 
2 See, e.g., Harry R. Webber, Home Depot Settling Several Shareholder 
Suits, Attorneys to Get $14.5M, Law.com, Apr. 4, 2008, http://www.law.com 
/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005561185 (noting defendant's agreement to adopt 
several corporate governance practices as part of a settlement agreement); 
Mary Pat Gallagher, Plaintiffs Lawyers Split $9.5M Fee in Shareholder 
Suit Against Schering-Plough, Law.com, Jan. 15, 2008, http://www.law. 
com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1200305133047 (noting defendant's agreement to 
create a staggered board, change the compensation scheme for directors, 
and centralize global compliance and audit functions); Ashby Jones, Firms 
Settle Backdating Suits-Some Private Cases End in Agreements; More 
Deals Ahead?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2007, at A15 (noting that Barnes & 
Noble had adopted fifteen governance changes in response to a lawsuit). 
3 Phyllis Plitch, Governance at Gunpoint: To Get Companies to Change 
Their Rules, Shareholders are Dangling a Powerful Carrot: Litigation 
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Prosecutors in federal criminal cases have also influenced 
corporate governance norms. Through the use of deferred 
prosecution agreements which often impose structural 
obligations on corporate defendants, Department of Justice 
lawyers, like plaintiffs' lawyers, have engineered many "deep 
governance reforms."4 These reforms have included the 
appointment of an independent monitor,5 the 
implementation of a detailed legal compliance program,6 
specific prescriptions regarding management's 
communications with outside auditors,7 splitting the 
positions of CEO and Chairman,8 and the appointment of 
additional outside directors.9 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), too, has 
been tinkering with corporate governance norms. It 
accomplishes this mission in the course of settling its civil 
enforcement actions. 1° For many years, the Commission has 
Settlement, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R6. Other settlements include a 
ban on the use of stock options to compensate directors and replacement of 
the Chairman and CEO. See E. Scott Reckard, Homestore to Settle Suit by 
Investors, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2003, at Bus. 1; Daniel Wagner & Kristina 
Fiore, DHB Deal Means Chiefs Ouster, NEWSDAY, July 14, 2006, at A48. 
4 Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 
853, 853 (2007). 
5 Twenty-one of the thirty-five deferred prosecution agreements 
adopted by the DOJ from January 2003 - January 2007 included the 
appointment of an independent monitor. Id. at Appendix A. "The 
monitors may become involved in uncovering and remedying new 
criminality totally unrelated to the agreement." Id. at 898. 
6 Id. ("These compliance programs are often sweeping, affecting both 
top management and low level employees."). 
7 See Christopher J. Christie & Robert M. Hanna, A Push Down the 
Road of Good Corporate Citizenship: The Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
Between the U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey and Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co., 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1043, 1051 (2006) (describing the terms 
of the agreement, including a requirement that the CEO, CFO, General 
Counsel, and Chief Compliance Officer meet with the auditors at least 
quarterly). 
8 Id. at 1052. 
9 Id. at 1053. 
10 See Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives 
"Naked, Homeless and Without Wheels": Corporate Fraud, Equitable 
Remedies, and the Debate Over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 
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settled cases with therapeutic provisiOns called 
"undertakings." In recent years, these undertakings have 
required the creation of new management positions, adoption 
of new accounting and reporting practices, reconfiguration of 
corporate training programs, and establishment of specific 
board-level committees and procedures. 11 Sometimes, the 
terms of SEC settlements require boards of directors to 
replace senior-level managers, engage and empower outside 
consultants, and overhaul a variety of financial and business 
practices. 12 
One might ask whether the SEC has the expertise to 
design desirable corporate governance changes or whether 
the therapeutic provisions the Commission has demanded 
are the right ones or the best ones for the corporate 
defendants in question. (Similar questions have been asked 
about the expertise of plaintiffs' lawyers and their clients 
and the value, if any, of the therapeutic settlements achieved 
in shareholder class actions. 13 The same questions have been 
asked quite aggressively about the expertise of federal 
prosecutors dealing with allegations of organizational 
crime.)14 One might also ask if the widespread reliance by 
the SEC on compliance consultants-a costly and intrusive 
practice-has become a matter of habit whose cost exceeds 
its benefits. Recent press coverage suggests that the use of 
such consultants may be a boondoggle-a way to reward 
former government staffers with lucrative contracts of little 
value to investors. 15 
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 627, 654 (2007) ("The SEC has too few resources for 
all the work it is asked to do, and hence seeks settlement rather than 
continued litigation of its enforcement actions."). 
11 See infra Part II. 
12 Id. 
13 Louis Lavelle, Smoke, Mirrors, and Shareholder Settlements, Bus. 
WK., Sept. 6, 2004, at 75. 
14 Garrett, supra note 4, at 933-35. 
15 See Dan Eggen, Ashcroft Defends Contract for His Firm; Democrats 
Questioning No·Bid Deal, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2008, at A3; Carrie 
Johnson, Ex-Officials Benefit From Corporate Clean-Up, WASH. POST, Jan. 
15, 2008, at Al. The issue of cronyism in the selection of consultants 
(called "monitors") in criminal cases was aired in Congressional hearings 
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This Article explores the use by the SEC of corporate 
therapeutics as a remedial tool. I will begin by examining 
the kinds of "therapeutics" the Commission currently favors16 
as well as the process by which therapeutic settlements are 
reachedY I will then explore the question of agency 
expertise.18 Does the SEC really add value to companies 
whose governance structures and procedures it alters? It is 
one thing for the SEC to demand structural changes at 
regulated entities such as brokerage firms or stock 
exchanges where it arguably has industry-specific expertise. 
It is quite another to imagine that the SEC has unique 
insights into the optimum governance practices of companies 
in every industry. 
Apart from the question of experti.se there is the question 
of ultimate efficacy. Research suggests that most corporate 
governance arrangements have little or no impact on 
shareholder value.19 Many legal compliance programs, too, 
may provide atmospherics but in fact do very little to 
improve a company's value.20 Some compliance programs are 
a farce. 21 So, why does the SEC insist upon these arrange-
ments? And what .evidence do we have that therapeutic 
settlements like those favored by the SEC have the intended 
effect of protecting investors or maximizing wealth? 
In addition to exploring the theory behind therapeutic 
settlements, this Article will explore some of the strategic 
considerations surrounding the use of therapeutic sanctions. 
How do SEC enforcement lawyers construct a menu of 
therapeutic options when they enter into settlement 
discussions? Is the list custom-tailored or cut-and-pasted 
from prior cases? (Or, are therapeutic provisions a product 
in March, 2008. The Department of Justice has now issued guidelines 
governing selection of monitors. See Steven R. Peikin, New Guidelines for 
Corporate Monitors, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 27, 2008, at 4. 
16 See infra Part II. 
17 See infra Parts III & IV. 
18 See infra Part VI. 
19 See infra Part VII. 
2o Id. 
21 See infra Part VIII. 
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of the defendant's initiative?) How does the SEC approach 
the tradeoff between monetary payouts and therapeutic 
sanctions? This Article incorporates the results of 
confidential interviews with several lawyers who handle 
SEC enforcement actions, both on the defense side and in the 
Enforcement Division of the SEC. Their comments provide 
useful insight into the priorities of the Enforcement staff as 
well as the strategies of corporate clients. 
The conclusion of this Article is a policy prescription.22 
The SEC has been admirably forthcoming in articulating its 
policies regarding the imposition of civil penalties against 
corporations. 23 I will propose that the SEC similarly 
articulate its policies regarding the use of therapeutic 
sanctions. 
II. THE SEC'S USE OF CORPORATE 
THERAPEUTICS 
The SEC in recent years has often negotiated therapeutic 
settlements addressing corporate governance and 
operational arrangements. These settlements may be placed 
on an "intrusiveness" continuum as follows: 
22 See infra Part X. 
23 See Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2006-4.htm [hereinafter Statement Concerning Financial Penalties) 
(describing the framework for determining civil penalties) . 
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Least Most 
Intrusive Intrusive 
Cease-and- Defendant Defendant Defendant must engage a Appointment 
desist order must under- must hire new consultant approved by the of a Monitor 
take remedial executives and SEC staff; the consultant will with broad 
efforts, then staff and make findings and recom- oversight 
report on the initiate new mendations for future pro- authority 
results to the programs and grams and practices; defendant 
SEC practices must adopt and implement the 
consultant's recommendations 
Working from the least intrusive to the most intrusive 
provisions,24 we begin with settlements like that involving 
Cummins, Inc. 25 In that case, the SEC alleged that 
Cummins had failed in some details of its accounting 
practices, resulting in a restatement of its financials for the 
preceding three years. Citing the company's self-reporting of 
its violations and voluntary remedial efforts (which are not 
described), the SEC settled the case by requiring Cummins 
to cease-and-desist from further violations of specified SEC 
rules. 26 
At the next point on the scale, we have the settlement in 
a case involving Bear, Stearns & Company, a financial 
services company regulated by the SEC. In this case, the 
24 Some settlements, of course, include no therapeutic provisions for 
reasons that will be discussed in Part IV. See, e.g., Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corp. ("Freddie Mac"), Litigation Release No. 20,304, 2007 SEC 
LEXIS 2277 (Sept. 27, 2007) (describing settlement of a major fraud case 
for a $50 million civil penalty with no accompanying therapeutic 
sanctions); In re Raytheon Co., Exchange Act Release No. 54,057, 2006 
SEC LEXIS 1501 (June 28, 2006) (noting a settlement by payment of a $12 
million civil penalty). 
25 In re Cummins, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 53,236, 2006 SEC 
LEXIS 246 (Feb. 7, 2006). 
26 Id. at *13-14. See also In re Consulting Servs. Group, LLC, 
Exchange Act Release No. 56,612, 2007 SEC LEXIS 2354 (Oct. 4, 2007) 
(detailing the defendant's voluntary remedial efforts, then imposing a 
cease-and-desist order). 
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SEC alleged violations of the "gun-jumping" rule, when Bear, 
Stearns brokers sent unauthorized e-mails to their clients 
during IPO "quiet periods.'027 Bear, Stearns was alleged to 
have failed to provide adequate supervision of its brokers 
and to have insufficient control systems to detect and deter 
the sending of the unauthorized e-mails. The settlement 
required only that Bear, Stearns review its procedures and 
"certify to the Commission in writing that it has completed 
its review and that it has established procedures ... which 
are reasonably expected to prevent and detect, insofar as 
practicable, [future] violations of Section 5."28 There was no 
cease-and-desist order and no financial penalty. 
At the center of the intrusiveness scale, we have the 
Qwest Communications settlement. In October 2004, the 
SEC charged Qwest with fraudulently recognizing over $3.8 
billion in revenue in a "multifaceted fraudulent scheme to 
meet optimistic and unsupportable revenue and earnings 
projections.''29 In settling the case, Qwest agreed to pay a 
$250 million civil penalty. It also agreed to create a new 
position of Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) whose charge 
would be to ensure the company complies with the federal 
securities laws. The CCO would report directly to a 
committee of outside directors.30 
The McAfee settlement offers an example at the next 
point on the scale. In January 2006, the SEC charged 
McAfee, Inc. with overstating its revenue and earnings by 
hundreds of millions of dollars. The complaint specifically 
alleged that, during the period 1998-2000, McAfee inflated 
its cumulative net revenues by $622 million.31 In settling the 
case, McAfee agreed to pay a $50 million civil penalty and 
27 In re Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8756, 
Exchange Act Release No. 54,806, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2701, at *2 (Nov. 21, 
2006). 
28 Id. at *20. 
29 Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18,936, 2004 
SEC LEXIS 2403 (Oct. 21, 2004). 
3o Id. 
31 McAfee, Inc., Litigation Release No. 19,520, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2360 
(Jan. 4, 2006). 
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submit to the entry of an "obey-the-law" injunction.32 In 
addition, McMee agreed to engage an independent 
consultant to examine and recommend improvements to 
McMee's internal accounting controls.33 
Finally, the WorldCom case offers an example of a 
settlement of a civil enforcement action at the "most 
intrusive" point on the scale. The settlement in WorldCom 
resulted in the appointment of a full-service monitor with 
exceptional powers.34 Typically, as happened here, full-
service monitors are appointed only in cases involving 
concurrent criminal charges brought by the Department of 
Justice.35 
These settlements, among scores involving therapeutic 
provisions, illustrate the types of options available in 
settlement negotiations with the SEC Enforcement Division. 
Let us look for a moment more specifically at some of the 
most common therapeutic prescriptions demanded by the 
SEC staff in recent years. 
32 Id. An "obey-the-law" injunction is one that directs the defendant 
to observe the requirements of certain enumerated statutes or regulations 
(e.g., the defendant shall not violate Rule 10b-5). Some courts have 
questioned the legitimacy of such injunctions. SEC v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 
1225, 1233 (11th Cir. 2006) ("[T]his court has held repeatedly that 'obey-
the-law' injunctions are unenforceable."). 
33 McMee, Inc., Litigation Release No. 19,520, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2360 
(Jan. 4, 2006). 
34 See Jennifer O'Hare, The Use of the Corporate Monitor in SEC 
Enforcement Actions, 1 BROOK. J . CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 89, 94-99 (2006) 
(describing the appointment and activities of the WorldCom monitor, 
Richard Breeden). 
35 See Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate 
Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713 (2007) 
(describing the use of corporate monitors in criminal cases, including cases 
involving the SEC); Sue Reisinger, Someone to Watch Over You, CORP. 
CsL., Sept. 20, 2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/indPubArticle 
IHC.jsp?id=ll90192571246 (describing the use of monitors in 28 criminal 
cases). 
HeinOnline -- 2008 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 802 2008
802 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2008 
A. New Management Structures and Personnel 
Sometimes, as in the Qwest settlement,36 the SEC insists 
upon the creation of new compliance bureaucracies. Often, 
this means simply the creation of a new senior management 
position. Minuteman International, Inc., for example, agreed 
to create the position of Chief Accounting Officer.37 Charter 
Communications, Inc. agreed to create a position known as 
Corporate Director of Credit and Collections.38 It may also, 
however, involve the creation of complete departments and 
new reporting structures. 
An extreme example involves Columbia Management 
Advisors. In response to allegations that the company had 
favored certain mutual fund clients and permitted them to 
engage in "market timing," Columbia's settlement with the 
SEC included the creation of a completely new "Compliance 
and Oversight Structure."39 The settlement required the 
creation of a Code of Ethics Oversight Committee comprised 
of senior executives who would meet quarterly; the creation 
of an Internal Compliance Controls Committee; the creation 
of a new full-time senior-level position to address conflicts of 
interest; the establishment of an employee-ombudsman 
position; and a commitment by the chief compliance officer to 
make quarterly reports to the fund's outside directors 
(known in this case as "independent trustees").40 The 
settlement also required a biennial outside review of the 
defendant's compliance programsY 
36 See Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18,936, 2004 
SEC LEXIS 2403 (Oct. 21, 2004). 
37 In re Minuteman Int'l, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 47,894, 2003 
SEC LEXIS 1228, at *16 (May 21, 2003). 
36 In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 50,098, 
2004 SEC LEXIS 1589, at *15 (July 27, 2004). 
39 In re Columbia Mgmt. Advisors, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 
8534, Exchange Act Release No. 51,164, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 26,752, 2005 SEC LEXIS 289, at *8, 48-62 (Feb. 9, 2005). 
40 Id. at *49-52. 
41 Id. at *62. 
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Other SEC settlements have required the creation of 
senior-level compliance or oversight committees,42 check-and-
balance procedures to guard against improper professional 
conduct,43 and specific assignments and day-to-day practices 
designed to minimize risk.44 In a handful of cases involving 
accounting firms, the settlement terms have also included 
revision of the defendant's business model and withdrawal 
from certain markets.45 
B. New Board-Level Structures and Board Practices 
In addition to new management structures and personnel 
assignments, the SEC occasionally also requires the creation 
ofboard-level committees and new board procedures. Recent 
settlements have included provisions for creation of 
42 See, e.g., In re Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., Securities Act Release No. 
8668, Exchange Act Release No. 53,490, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 27,262, 2006 SEC LEXIS 623, at *81-82 (Mar. 16, 2006). In re 
Millennium Partners, L.P., Securities Act Release No. 8639, Exchange Act 
Release No. 52,863, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,172, 2005 
SEC LEXIS 3078, at *27 (Dec. 1, 2005). 
In at least one settlement, the composition of the compliance committee 
was specified: "to be chaired by the Vice President, Securities Compliance 
of Hartford Life, [and to include) senior business leaders from the 
Investment Products Division, at least one member of Hartford Life's legal 
department and at least one member of the Disclosure Review 
Committee." In re Hartford Inv. Fin. Servs., LLC, Securities Act Release 
No. 8750, Exchange Act Release No. 54,720, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 27,549, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2571, at *21 (Nov. 8, 2006). 
43 In re KPMG LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 50,564, 2004 SEC 
LEXIS 2388, at *42 (Oct. 20, 2004) (requiring the firm's auditors to consult 
with the Department of Professional Practice under enumerated 
circumstances, and to have the Department of Professional Practice review 
and approve documents for certain clients). 
44 In re PKF, Securities Act Release No. 8675, Exchange Act Release 
No. 53,633, 2006 SEC LEXIS 833, at *44 (Apr. 12, 2006) (requiring the 
firm to involve a Quality Control and Compliance Partner in all audit 
engagements of ''high risk" clients). 
45 Id. (prohibiting the firm from taking on any new U.S. public 
company audit clients for a period of one year); In reGrant Thornton LLP, 
Exchange Act Release No. 50,148, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1703, at *50 (Aug. 5, 
2004) (prohibiting the firm from engaging in joint audits for a period of 
five years). 
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temporary committees to select the outside consultants who 
will devise corrective post-settlement measures,46 creation of 
permanent committees to oversee ongoing compliance 
activities,47 and specific tasks for compliance and audit 
committees.48 Settlements frequently call for enhancements 
to training programs for members of the board.49 They 
sometimes also require expansion of the board and even may 
include a statement of qualifications for board membership. 5° 
In rare cases (typically those also involving criminal 
prosecution), we find more intrusive provisions at the board 
level: the separation of the positions of Chairman and CE0;51 
the amendment of bylaws to create term limits for outside 
directors;52 and the appointment of an "Inspector General" 
who reports directly to the Audit Committee.53 In a few 
46 In re Akorn, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 48,546, 2003 SEC 
LEXIS 2276, at *13 (Sept. 25, 2003). 
47 Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18,891, 2004 
SEC LEXIS 2157, at *7 (Sept. 22, 2004) (creating a new Compliance 
Committee of the Board of Directors). 
48 In re Hartford Inv. Fin. Servs. LLC, Securities Act Release No. 
8750, Exchange Act Release No. 54,720, Investment Company Act 27,549, 
2006 SEC LEXIS 2571, at *21 (Nov. 8, 2006) (requiring an annual 
presentation to the board's Compliance Committee, including a thorough 
review of the company's revenue sharing arrangements); In re Coca Cola 
Co., Securities Act Release No. 8569, Exchange Act Release No. 51,565, 
2005 SEC LEXIS 861, at *23 (Apr. 18, 2005) (requiring the Audit 
Committee to generate a set of criteria for use in the preparation of the 
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of the company's 
public filings). 
49 In re Applix, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8651, Exchange Act 
Release No. 53,049, 2006 SEC LEXIS 8, at *14 (Jan. 4, 2006). 
50 In re Microstrategy, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 43,724, 2000 
SEC LEXIS 2764, at *21 (Dec. 14, 2000) (requiring the appointment of an 
additional independent board member who shall have prior experience as 
a Chief Financial Officer of a public company or as a member of a public 
company Audit Committee). 
61 Parmalat Finanziaria, S.p.A., Litigation Release No. 18,803, 
Accounting & Auditing Release No. 2065, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1631, at *5 
(July 28, 2004). 
52 Id. 
63 HealthSouth Corp., Litigation Release No. 19,280, 2005 SEC LEXIS 
1480, at *2 (June 23, 2005). 
HeinOnline -- 2008 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 805 2008
No. 3:793] CORPORATE THERAPEUTICS AT THE SEC 805 
cases involving regulated entities, we find additional 
provisions aimed at the board of directors: a requirement 
that the chairman be an independent director with no prior 
involvement in the allegations brought by the SEC;54 a 
limitation on the number of incumbent directors who may 
continue to serve as members of the board;55 and a require-
ment that future decisions receive a majority vote of 
independent directors.56 Generally though, and especially in 
cases involving public issuers, we rarely see "deep 
governance reforms"57 incorporated into SEC civil 
settlements. Indeed, the Commission expressly disclaims 
any interest in intruding into high-level corporate 
governance decisions in cases involving public issuers.58 
54 In re Bane of Am. Capital Mgmt., LLC, Securities Act Release No. 
8538, Exchange Act Release No. 51,167, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 26,756, 2005 SEC LEXIS 291, at *61 (Feb. 9, 2005); In re Columbia 
Mgmt. Advisors, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8534, Exchange Act 
Release No. 51,164, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,752, 2005 
SEC LEXIS 289, at *43 (Feb. 9, 2005). 
55 In re Bane of Am. Capital Mgmt., LLC, Securities Act Release No. 
8538, Exchange Act Release No. 51,167, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 26,756, 2005 SEC LEXIS 291, at *60 (Feb. 9, 2005); In re Columbia 
Mgmt. Advisors, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8534, Exchange Act 
Release No. 51,164, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,752, 2005 
SEC LEXIS 289, at *43 (Feb. 9, 2005). 
56 In re Bane of Am. Capital Mgmt., LLC, Securities Act Release No. 
8538, Exchange Act Release No. 51,167, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 26,756, 2005 SEC LEXIS 291, at *62 (Feb. 9, 2005); In re Columbia 
Mgmt. Advisors, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8534, Exchange Act 
Release No. 51,164, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,752, 2005 
SEC LEXIS 289, at *44 (Feb. 9, 2005). 
57 See Garrett, supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
56 See Cedric Kushner Promotions, Inc., Litigation Release No. 19,485, 
2005 SEC LEXIS 3124, at *3 (Dec. 5, 2005). 
The remedial undertakings [in this case] include 
appointment of new Chief Executive and Financial 
Officers, creation of an independent audit committee and 
majority independent board of directors, and retention of 
an independent consultant to analyze the company's 
internal accounting controls, recommend improvements 
and oversee implementation of those improvements. These 
undertakings represent an unusual departure from the 
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C. Employee Training Programs 
Often, the problem giving rise to systemic fraud is 
exacerbated by the lack of appropriate training and feedback 
for employees, especially professional employees involved in 
a company's finance or reporting functions. Thus, many SEC 
settlements call for the development of employee training 
programs. In settlements involving the accounting firms 
Grant Thornton and Ernst & Young, for example, the firms 
were required to provide their audit professionals with fraud 
detection training conducted by the Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners.59 A settlement with KPMG required re-
training for all of the firm's partners and managers.60 A 
settlement with the Boston Stock Exchange required the 
Exchange to provide re-training for its regulatory staff. 61 
D. Engagement of Compliance Consultants 
One of the most common therapeutic sanctions in SEC 
settlements is an order to hire an outside consultant to guide 
Commission's policy of limited intrusion into corporate 
governance, but were required by the unique facts of this 
case: the company's current two person board of directors 
consists of its Chairman, President and CEO Kushner who 
will not be barred from serving as an officer or director of 
any public company, and its Principal Financial and 
Accounting Officer James DiLorenzo who is a defendant 
litigating similar charges of fraud brought by the 
Commission. Further, Kushner and DiLorenzo collectively 
are beneficial owners of 45% of the company's outstanding 
voting shares. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
59 In reGrant Thornton LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 50,148, 2004 
SEC LEXIS 1703, at *50 (Aug. 5, 2004); In re Ernst & Young Chartered 
Accountants, Exchange Act Release No. 56,104, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1593, at 
*29 (July 19, 2007). 
60 In re KPMG LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 50,564, 2004 SEC 
LEXIS 2388, at *41 (Oct. 20, 2004). 
61 In re Boston Stock Exch., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 56,352, 
2007 SEC LEXIS 1961, at *17 (Sept. 5, 2007). See also In reAm. Stock 
Exch. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 55,507, 2007 SEC LEXIS 535, at 
*35 (Mar. 22, 2007) (requiring re-training for all floor staff). 
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the company in improving its financial reporting procedures. 
This type of sanction has been praised by some scholars as 
an ideal bridge between self-regulation and traditional, 
command-and-control regulation.62 The theory is that 
engagement of a consultant to devise remedial strategies 
creates "a temporal, structural, and dialogical space for 
trying to work through stubborn cultural problems."63 
In a case alleging that ConAgra had under-reported its 
tax liabilities by $105 million, for example, the SEC required 
that ConAgra engage an independent consultant to review 
the company's policies and procedures with respect to 
reporting certain reserve accounts and prescribe a menu of 
operational reforms. 64 In a case involving Akorn, Inc., the 
SEC required engagement of an independent consultant to 
review the company's policies and procedures with respect to 
accounts receivable.65 
Consultants may address a broad range of issues 
affecting a company's accounting and reporting practices-
the adequacy of a company's compliance resources (including 
staffing and compensation), 66 the adequacy of procedures for 
handling inventory valuation,67 the relationship between 
sales and finance employees m revenue recognition 
62 David Hess & Cristie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform 
Undertakings: A New Approach to an Old Problem, CORNELL INT'L L. J . 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 6), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1029849 (arguing that when undertaken with care, independent 
monitoring provides the best available means for addressing problems of 
organizational culture). 
63 Id. (manuscript at 41). 
64 ConAgra Foods, Inc., Litigation Release No. 20,206, 2007 SEC 
LEXIS 1610, at *6 (July 25, 2007). In addition, ConAgra had to pay a $45 
million civil penalty and consent to an obey-the-law injunction. Id. at *5. 
65 In re Akorn, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 48,546, 2003 SEC 
LEXIS 2276, at *13 (Sept. 25, 2003). 
66 In re Boston Stock Exch., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 56,352, 
2007 SEC LEXIS 1961, at *17 (Sept. 5, 2007) (requiring the defendant to 
retain an independent auditor to evaluate the adequacy of the company's 
resources, including staffing and compensation, related to surveillance, 
investigation, examination, and disciplinary programs). 
67 In re Warnaco Group, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 49,675, 2004 
SEC LEXIS 955, at *38 (May 11, 2004). 
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determinations,68 the mechanics of signing and dating sales 
contracts and purchase orders and the generation of sales 
invoices to customers,69 and a company's practices with 
respect to disclosure generally. 70 
Consultants may also address other systemic issues. 
They have been charged with designing procedures for 
avoiding liability for foreign payments under the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act,71 procedures governing the misuse of 
non-public information,72 regulations governing travel and 
entertainment expenses,73 systems for receipt and retention 
of e-mail communications,74 and even pricing policies.75 Once 
adopted, the consultants' recommendations themselves 
become subject to periodic review by other consultants. 76 
68 In re Applix, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8651, Exchange Act 
Release No. 53,049, 2006 SEC LEXIS 8, at *14 (Jan. 4, 2006). 
69 In re Aspen Tech., Inc. , Securities Act Release No. 8827, Exchange 
Act Release No. 56,170, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1656, at *23 (July 31, 2007). 
7° Cardinal Health, Inc. , Litigation Release No. 20,212, 2006 SEC 
LEXIS 1622, at *4 (July 26, 2007) (in addition to paying a $35 million civil 
penalty, the company agreed to retain an independent consultant to 
conduct a review of its disclosure practices). 
71 In re Statoil, ASA, Exchange Act Release No. 54,599, 2006 SEC 
LEXIS 2321, at *21 (Oct. 13, 2006). 
72 In re Hutchens Inv. Mgmt. Inc., Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
Release No. 2514, 2006 SEC LEXIS 1039, at *15 (May 9, 2006). 
73 In re Jeffries & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 54,861, 2006 SEC 
LEXIS 2813, at *12 (Dec. 1, 2006). 
74 In re Kaplan & Co. Sec., Inc. , Exchange Act Release No. 55,954, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 27,601, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2946 at 
*19 (Dec. 18, 2006); In re Morgan Stanley, Litigation Release No. 19,693, 
2006 SEC LEXIS 1052 at *2 (May 10, 2006). 
75 In re Kelmoore Inv. Co., Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8774, 
Exchange Act Release No. 55,123, Investment Company Act Release No. 
27,667,2007 SEC LEXIS 101, at *4 (Jan. 18, 2007). 
76 In re Federated Inv. Mgmt. Co., Exchange Act Release No. 52,839, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 27,167, 2005 SEC LEXIS 3038 at 
*27 (Nov. 28, 2005) (requiring a Periodic Compliance Review at least once 
every three years); In re Invesco Funds Group, Inc., Exchange Act Release 
No. 50,506, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,629, 2004 SEC 
LEXIS 2318, at *37 (Oct. 8, 2004) (requiring a Periodic Compliance Review 
at least every other year). 
HeinOnline -- 2008 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 809 2008
No. 3:793] CORPORATE THERAPEUTICS AT THE SEC 809 
Typically, settlements calling for the use of a compliance 
consultant require approval of the consultant by the SEC 
staff,77 a timeline for submission of the consultant's 
report(s),78 and a promise that the defendant will adopt the 
consultant's recommendations even in the event of a 
principled disagreement. 79 Defendants do not have the 
authority to terminate the independent consultant without 
prior permission of the SEC staff.80 They must authorize the 
consultant to share information with the staff; all privileges 
must be waived.81 And, finally, the consultant is barred from 
providing any ancillary services to the defendant and its 
77 In re Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., Securities Act Release No. 8832, 
Exchange Act Release No. 56,229, Investment Company Act Release No. 
27,925, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1767, at *14 (Aug. 9, 2007) ("General American 
shall retain, within 90 days of the date of entry of the Order, the services 
of an Independent Compliance Consultant not unacceptable to the staff of 
the Commission."). 
78 In re Dunham & Assocs. Holdings, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 
8740, Exchange Act Release No. 54,489, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 27,495, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2099, at *11 (Sept. 22, 2006) ("At the end of 
the review, which in no event shall be more than 150 days after the date of 
this Order, [the defendant] shall require the Independent Consultant to 
submit to [the defendant] and to Briane Nelson Mitchell or another 
designated representative of the Commission's Pacific Regional Office in 
Los Angeles an Independent Consultant's Report. The Independent 
Consultant's Report shall describe the review performed and the 
conclusions reached and shall include any recommendations deemed 
necessary to make the policies and procedures adequate and address the 
deficiencies identified in [a previous section of this] Order."). 
79 In re Schnitzer Steel Indus., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 54,606, 
SEC LEXIS 2332, at *5 (Oct. 16, 2006) ("[The defendant] shall adopt all 
recommendations in the report of the Compliance Consultant; provided, 
however, [reference here to a mediation procedure]. In the event [the 
defendant] and the Compliance Consultant are unable to agree . . . [the 
defendant] shall abide by the determinations of the Compliance 
Consultant."). 
80 In re A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 55,692, 
2007 SEC LEXIS 891, at *6 (May 2, 2007). 
8 1 Id. ("[The defendant] shall not be in and shall not have an attomey-
client relationship with the Independent Consultant and shall not seek to 
invoke the attorney-client privilege or any other doctrine or privilege to 
prevent the Independent Consultant from transmitting any information, 
reports or documents to the Commission or the Commission's staff."). 
HeinOnline -- 2008 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 810 2008
810 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2008 
managers for a period of two years following completion of 
the consultant's final report.82 
The scope of the consultant's work varies in these 
settlements. Sometimes, the range of issues to be considered 
by the consultant is broad;83 at other times, the assignment 
82 See, e.g., In re Aspen Tech., Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8827, 
Exchange Act Release No. 56,170, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1656, at *26 (July 31, 
2007) (" ... [F) or the period of engagement and for a period of two years 
from completion of the engagement, the Independent Consultant shall not 
enter into any employment, consultant, attorney-client, auditing or other 
professional relationship with [the defendant], or any of its present or 
former affiliates, directors, officers, employees, or agents, respectively, 
acting in their capacity as such."). 
83 See, e.g., In re Vertical Capital Partners, Inc., Exchange Act Release 
No. 55,177, Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Release No. 2586, 2007 SEC 
LEXIS 150, at *13 (Jan. 25, 2007) (authorizing the consultant to conduct 
"a comprehensive review of Vertical's supervisory, compliance, and other 
policies and procedures designed to prevent and detect conflicts of interest, 
breaches of fiduciary duty, and federal securities law violations by Vertical 
and its employees. This review shall include, but shall not be limited to, a 
review of Vertical's policies and procedures in the areas of trade 
processing, compensation of registered representatives, and the training of 
registered and unregistered staff"); In re Fred Alger Mgmt. Inc., Exchange 
Act Release No. 55,118, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,663, 
2007 SEC LEXIS 100 (Jan. 18, 2007) at *29 (authorizing the consultant to 
conduct a "comprehensive review of Respondents' supervisory, compliance, 
and other policies and procedures designed to prevent and detect breaches 
of fiduciary duty, breaches of the Code of Ethics and federal securities law 
violations by Respondents and their employees. This review shall include, 
but shall not be limited to, a review of Respondents' market timing 
controls, Respondents' sales and distribution practices, a review of the 
Alger funds' pricing practices that may make those funds vulnerable to 
market timing, a review of the Alger funds' utilization of short term 
trading fees and other controls for deterring excessive short term 
trading"); In re Bane of Am. Capital Mgmt., LLC, Securities Act Release 
No. 8538, Exchange Act Release No. 51,167, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,756, 2005 SEC LEXIS 291, at *82 (Feb. 9, 2005) 
(authorizing the consultant to conduct "a comprehensive review of BAS's 
supervisory, compliance, and other policies and procedures designed to 
prevent and detect conflicts of interest, breaches of fiduciary duty, 
breaches of the Code of Ethics and federal securities law violations by BAS 
and its employees related to the retail sale and retail brokerage order 
processing of mutual funds") . 
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is narrowly drawn.84 Sometimes, and wisely, the detailed 
scope of work is left to be worked out between the defendant 
and the consultant, subject to the SEC's approval.85 Though 
there is little public information about the costs of these 
arrangements (or the identity of the consultants selected), 
the fees for a consultant may run as high as millions of 
dollars each year.86 
E. Micromanagement By Consent 
In some cases, SEC settlements prescribe changes in 
corporate practices with remarkable specificity. For 
example, the SEC alleged that Charter Communications, 
Inc., a cable provider, had ignored customer requests to 
84 See, e.g., In re Aspen Tech. Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8827, 
Exchange Act Release No. 56,170, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1656, at *23 (July 31, 
2007) (authorizing the consultant "to review Aspen's financial and 
accounting policies and procedures relating to: (i) revenue recognition on 
software licensing agreements, including the consideration of SOP 97-2 
and documentation of that consideration; (ii) the signing and dating of 
material sales contracts and purchase orders and the retention by Aspen's 
corporate finance organization of all such contracts and purchase orders; 
(iii) written documentation that all sales contingencies have been met in 
material revenue transactions; (iv) the generation and issuance to 
customers of sales invoices; and (v) the preparation and review of accounts 
receivable confirmations. Aspen shall require the Independent Consultant 
to also consider, based on his/her review, the nature and extent of Aspen's 
Board of Directors training required to minimize the possibility of future 
violations of the federal securities laws by Aspen, acting through its 
finance and accounting employees"). 
85 See In re E*Trade Clearing LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 58,250, 
2008 SEC LEXIS 1793, at *9 (July 30, 2008) ("E*Trade will require the 
consultant, within sixty (60) days of the Consultant's engagement, to 
develop a written plan of sufficient scope and detail to achieve the 
regulatory review objectives set forth in Paragraph 14.d below."). 
86 See Reisinger, supra note 35 (noting that one consultant, a former 
federal judge, had submitted bills over a 16-month period totaling $7.2 
million); Philip Shenon, Ashcroft Deal Brings Scrutiny in Justice Dept., 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2008, at A1 (describing arrangement by which former 
Attorney General John Ashcroft was appointed as monitor in a criminal 
case, resulting in a contract worth between $28 million and $52 million). 
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discontinue service.87 This permitted Charter to overstate its 
subscriber base and thereby inflate its financial statements. 
Charter's settlement of the case included detailed 
undertakings on the subject of handling requests to 
discontinue service.88 It also specified the mechanism for 
record-keeping for customers who were late in paying their 
bills.89 It prescribed a "bottom up" rather than a "top down" 
87 In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 50,098, 
2004 SEC LEXIS 1589 (July 27, 2004). 
88 Id. 
[The company will] adopt a zero tolerance policy on holding 
or managing disconnects in order to inflate subscriber 
numbers and terminate employee found to be managing or 
holding disconnects for this purpose. In addition, Charter's 
Chief Executive Officer will issue quarterly written 
reminders to all employees regarding Charter's zero 
tolerance policy for holding or managing disconnects in 
order to inflate subscriber numbers. 
ld. at *5. 
89 ld. 
I d. 
[The company will] institute a formal written policy that 
details disconnect procedures for terminating the service of 
delinquent paying subscribers. This policy will require 
that delinquent paying customers' service be terminated 60 
to 75 days after their account balance becomes past due 
("termination date") and that their balances be written off 
to bad debt 90 to 110 days after their account balances 
become past due ("write off date"). Charter may 
specifically identify a few categories of subscribers that, for 
historical business reasons, Charter permits to remain as 
active subscribers for more than 75 days after a bill 
becomes past due. Any exceptions Charter makes to allow 
a delinquent paying customer to remain an active 
subscriber after 75 days of non-payment shall be 
documented, reviewed and approved by Key Market Area 
management personnel at or before the close of each billing 
cycle . . . . 
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budgeting process for the company.90 It even specified 
revisions to the method of setting employee compensation.91 
This kind of micromanagement often occurs in cases 
involving regulated entities. In a case involving 
misrepresentations by Edwards D. Jones & Co. about its 
representatives' compensation in the sale of so-called 529 
plans (investments for future educational costs), the 
settlement included detailed undertakings governing the 
marketing of these plans.92 In a case against Bear, Stearns 
involving late trading and market timing, the settlement 
included a provision addressing the specifics of a new 
compliance program. 93 
Presumably, all these undertakings were approved by the 
defendants' lawyers. Still, prescribing these practices so 
90 Id. at *6. 
91 Id. 
92 In re Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., Securities Act Release No. 
8520A, Exchange Act Release No. 50,910A, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1547, at *7 
(July 13, 2007). 
93 In re Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8668, 
Exchange Act Release No. 53,490, Investment Company Act No. 27,262, 
2006 SEC LEXIS 623, at *88 (Mar. 16, 2006). 
Respondents shall establish, within 30 days after the entry 
of this Order, a Compliance Hotline and appoint an 
appropriate compliance or legal officer(s) to be available to 
answer questions, on an anonymous basis, about business 
practices or ethical issues and to receive complaints from 
employees regarding any conduct that may be a cause for 
concern. Employees shall be provided with the email 
address and telephone number for the Compliance Hotline. 
Respondents will also provide all employees with quarterly 
compliance alerts identifying areas of interest and 
providing the email and telephone numbers for the 
Compliance Hotline .... 
Id.; see also In re Bane of Am. Securities LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 
55,466, 2007 SEC LEXIS 492, at *47-66 (Mar. 24, 2007) (detailing dozens 
of items to implement the separation of market analysis from investment 
banking); In re Putnam Inv. Mgmt. LLC, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,788, 2005 SEC LEXIS 675, at *21-25 (Mar. 23, 2005) 
(detailing procedures governing the selection of broker-dealers through 
which the defendant may trade). 
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narrowly may stifle mid-course correction and leave 
managers wondering where to go for permission to adjust 
arrangements that do not work. Defendants would 
undoubtedly prefer a "blank check" approach, in which they 
undertake merely to find their own solution to a problem and 
report the results to the SEC staff.94 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THERAPEUTIC 
UNDERTAKINGS 
In preparing this Article, I interviewed eight lawyers who 
either work in the SEC's Enforcement Division or represent 
defendants in SEC enforcement proceedings.95 Most of the 
defense lawyers are also former SEC lawyers, so they were 
able to describe the negotiation process from both sides of 
the table. I promised each of these sources anonymity and 
found them to be not only generous with their time but also 
candid and thoughtful in their comments. What follows is a 
compilation of their observations, highlighting issues upon 
which they did not always agree. 
First, two of the sources offered a historical perspective 
on the use of corporate therapeutics by the SEC. The 
practice began during the tenure of former Enforcement 
Chief Stanley Sporkin.96 Sporkin particularly liked to 
require the appointment of consultants in cases involving 
regulated entities-his thought was that putting a 
consultant in place had the effect of "extend[ing] the power 
of the Enforcement staff."97 In Sporkin's view, the consultant 
94 See, e.g., In re Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., Securities Act Release No. 
8756, Exchange Act Release No. 54,806, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2701, at *2 
(Nov. 21, 2006). 
95 These interviews were conducted as follows: Source #1 (Sept. 26, 
2007; Nov. 15, 2007); Source #2 (Sept. 27, 2007); Source #3 (Oct. 1, 2007); 
Source #4 (Oct. 2, 2007); Source #5 (Oct. 2, 2007); Source #6 (Oct. 15, 
2007); Source #7 (Oct. 22, 2007); Source #8 (Oct. 22, 2007). 
96 Judge Sporkin was director of the division from 1974-1981. John F. 
Berry, An SEC Legacy: Sporkin Known As Tough, Open, WASH. POST, Apr. 
22, 1981, at El. 
97 Source #1. 
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was there to serve as the "eyes and ears" of the staff and to 
"complete their investigation from the inside. "98 
Later, the Enforcement Division broadened the use of 
compliance consultants and other therapeutic sanctions to 
cases involving public issuers.99 Sporkin's staff became "very 
aggressive" in their use of therapeutic settlement terms-
requiring "audit committees, different kinds of directors, 
[and] restructurings."100 Settlements then, as now, were 
"heavily negotiated."101 
A. The Enforcement Staffs Approach to Therapeutic 
Undertakings 
Today, the Enforcement staff decides early on if it intends 
to seek therapeutic sanctions. Three factors are important in 
this determination: (1) whether the company's wrongdoing 
was a product of "dismal internal controls" or was an isolated 
incident; (2) what the company has done proactively since 
the discovery of the wrongdoing to remediate the problem; 
and (3) how fast the settlement discussions proceed.102 
(Ironically, a quick settlement may be more likely to include 
therapeutic provisions than a settlement that comes later, 
after the company has cleaned up its own mess.) 
In most cases that have arisen since passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 103 the defendant had already adopted 
various types of compliance programs.104 Most well-lawyered 
companies, upon learning of the SEC's interest, have also 
conducted an internal investigation and their audit 
committees have adopted some form of remediation plan. 105 
98 ld. 
99 ld. 
100 Source #3. 
101 ld. 
102 Source #2. 
103 Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection 
(Sarbanes-Oxley) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.). 
104 Source #3. 
105 The template for a remediation plan is the so-called "Seaboard 
Report." See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text. 
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So, "by the time the staff gets to [the negotiation phase], 
much of the correction has already been done."106 In the 
worst cases, moreover, old management has been replaced. 107 
The task for the Enforcement staff, then, is to determine 
whether further corrective steps are required, in addition to 
the steps already taken "voluntarily."108 There are resources 
available for making this determination-the Enforcement 
staff lawyer's own experience in other cases, lawyers in the 
Corporation Finance division, the Chief Accountant's office, 
and sometimes consultants engaged by the Commission.109 
"Hopefully, Enforcement consults within the Commission," 
but that may not always occur. 110 As noted below, much 
depends on who the lawyers are during the investigatory 
phase. The process is particularly unpredictable when it 
involves the regional offices rather than the Enforcement 
Division's main office in Washington, D.C.111 (The regional 
offices are said by my sources to be "quite independent.")112 
B. Negotiating the Settlement Terms 
Once it is clear that Enforcement wants to impose some 
type of therapeutic sanction, the Enforcement staff typically 
presents a first draft of a settlement agreement, cut-and-
pasted from earlier settlements.113 (The Enforcement staff 
does not like it when the defendant submits a first draft.)114 
The draft has typically been prepared by the junior-most 
person on the Enforcement team. Sometimes, the draft is 
"over the top" and "doesn't reflect the fact that a settlement 
has been [or is likely to be] reached."115 Often, the first draft 
106 Source #3. 
107 Source #4. 
108 See infra Part IV. 
109 Source #3. 
11o Id. 
111 Source #4. 
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includes a proposal for the appointment of a full-service 
compliance monitor.U6 
Then, the defense lawyers chip away at the proposed 
therapeutic provisions, both by exchange of "mark-ups" of 
the document and by in-person meetings with the 
Enforcement staff. 117 Defense lawyers try to avoid the most 
burdensome provisions-appointment of a monitor with 
broad supervisory powers, appointment of any form of 
compliance consultant, and a requirement that the company 
hire new people, in that order. 118 
The issue of compliance consultants is often a stumbling 
block because "everybody hates them."119 Not only are they 
expensive and disruptive, many clients believe that inclusion 
of a consultant in the terms of an SEC settlement agreement 
sends an adverse signal to the market.12° For market-
watchers who are paying attention, the staffs insistence on 
inclusion of a consultant provision in a settlement involving 
116 Id. 
117 !d. 
118 Source #2. They also try to avoid the inclusion in the settlement of 
an obey-the-law injunction. Clients believe such injunctions send an 
adverse market signal. They also may have significant collateral 
consequences, especially for regulated entities. Source #1. 
119 Source #1. The resistance to the use of compliance consultants was 
a common theme in my interviews with defense counsel. Consultants are 
"very intrusive; companies hate them." Source #4. Their presence is 
"painful, time-consuming, and colossally expensive." Source #2. Even 
where consultants generate good recommendations, "the cost usually far 
outweighs the benefit." Source #8. One lawyer reports that a consultant 
for one of his clients "ran up a nine-figure bill with no discernible benefit 
to the company or the shareholders." !d. Another concedes "you do hear 
stories of consultancies that have lost their way." Source #7. Some 
consultants feel they "must justifY themselves" so, after 18 months of 
investigation, they "come up with a bunch of busy work for people to do" in 
order to make their work seem valuable. Id. As a result, "firms are [often] 
forced to do things that don't make sense." Source #1. The prevailing 
view among my sources was that "few [law or consulting firms] can do this 
work well." !d. 
120 Source #8. 
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a public issuer "often signal[s] continued mistrust by the 
staff of someone in senior management."121 
In these discussions, any thought of a full-service monitor 
virtually always disappears122 and, in Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act ("FCPA") cases, the "consultant" provision 
almost never disappears. That is, FCPA settlements 
requiring the engagement of a compliance consultant are 
now "routine."123 In other cases, however, insistence on the 
inclusion of therapeutic provisions depends largely on the 
Enforcement Division's lawyers' sense of the defendant's 
current corporate culture. "If the staff thinks the company is 
rotten, they'll be more insistent" on therapeutic sanctions. 124 
Often the outcome hinges on the key question-"who did you 
fire?"I2s 
The settlement process is often idiosyncratic. "Different 
staff people have different issues."126 That is, some 
Enforcement lawyers "think [therapeutic provisions] are very 
important" and are inclined to want to "micromanage" the 
defendant.127 Other Enforcement lawyers care much less 
about these items and view them largely as "window 
dressing."128 To the second group, undertakings may "look 
good" but are unlikely to have much effect on the company. 
These lawyers prefer to seek entry of an obey-the-law 
injunction-the "crown jewel" of SEC settlement 
121 Source #1. 
122 As noted above, full-service monitors are usually appointed only in 
cases involving criminal charges. See supra note 35. 
123 Source #2. 
124 Source#l. A former SEC lawyer who reviewed this Article 
mentioned a related scenario that might give rise to a demand for 
therapeutic sanctions. Not only do SEC lawyers react to what they 
perceive to be untrustworthiness on the part of corporate executives, they 
may also react to what they consider disrespect from the company's 
lawyers. "Sometimes it's personal." I d. 
125 Source #3. See also infra Part V. 
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negotiations129-and leave the details of future compliance to 
the company.130 
So, the outcome of settlement discussions may depend in 
part on the specific staff lawyers involved. And, it is 
sometimes necessary to take remedial issues "up the chain" 
within the Enforcement Division to the senior staff. 
Experienced defense lawyers have found that senior level 
staffers are often "[more] sensitive to invading state law 
issues."131 They are also "[more] mindful of imposing 
undertakings."132 They're willing to offer "a lot of due 
process"133 and sometimes substitute their judgment for that 
of the over-eager junior staff lawyers. 134 Overall, however, 
"there is not a lot of central direction on this kind of thing."135 
There are often other issues on the table. For example, 
there is the question of the size of the civil penalty. That is, 
just as negotiations proceed on the subject of therapeutic 
sanctions, they also proceed on the amount of the penalty. 136 
Tradeoffs are never explicit-the SEC staff would "recoil at 
the thought that defendants could buy their way out" of a 
penalty simply by accepting more intrusive undertakings. 137 
129 Source #4. 
130 See, e.g., Veritas Software Corp., Litigation Release No. 20008, 
2007 SEC LEXIS 341 (Feb. 21, 2007) (noting that the defendant had 
agreed to pay a $30 million civil penalty and submit to entry of an obey-
the-law injunction); Tenet Healthcare Corp., Litigation Release No. 20067, 
2007 SEC LEXIS 610, at *1-2 (Apr. 2, 2007) (a $10 million penalty and an 
obey-the-law injunction). 
131 Source #1. 
132 !d. 
133 !d. 
134 !d. "When you get up high enough-past the people who are 
wedded to the case"-a lawyer can often soften the terms of a settlement. 
This may include denial of the lower-level staff's "emotional demands for 
scalps." !d. 
135 Source #4. 
136 Under current procedures, the Commission must set the 
parameters for a civil penalty before settlement negotiations begin. 
Thomas 0 . Gorman & William McGrath, A Guide for Avoiding Liability: 
Understanding Key SEC Enforcement Policies and Priorities, CoRP. Gov. 
ADVISOR, July/Aug. 2008, at 21. 
137 Source #2. 
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But many companies are just "desperate for closure."138 So, 
there are tradeoffs. And "sometimes corporate governance 
undertakings are way down the list."139 That is, a firm may 
be anxious to reduce its penalty from, say, $150 million to 
$100 million, and if the cost of that is the acceptance of 
intrusive therapeutic provisions, including the appointment 
of a consultant or consultants, the company will willingly 
sign off. 140 
C. Selection of the Compliance Consultant 
Where a compliance consultant is part of the settlement 
package, the identity of the consultant is negotiable with the 
staff but is rarely contested.141 That is, the company comes 
up with a suggested name or names.142 The staff then spends 
some time talking with the person(s) selected.143 The focus of 
the interview is primarily on two issues-the consultant's 
"independence" and "perspective" on enforcement issues. 144 
The staff takes the interview process "very seriously."145 
Thus, well-advised companies know to turn to former SEC or 
138 Source #1. 
139 ld. 
140 Another consideration sometimes on the table during settlement 
negotiations is whether the defendant will be charged with a violation of 
Rule 10b-5. Such charges, even if settled, "virtually guarantee a class 
action, [preclude] the use of the PSLRA safe harbor for forward looking 
statements for 3-5 years, and make the issuer ineligible for the 'well 
known seasoned issuer' (WKSI) offering procedures. Much mischief is done 
trying to avoid a fraud charge -- [payment of] higher fines, terminations of 
key employees, agreeing to findings of iffy reporting violations, re-styling 
an SEC antifraud injunction as an order enforcing NASD rules, etc." 
E-mail from source to author, Nov. 13, 2007 (on file with the author). 
141 Source #4. 
142 Typically, the names are generated by the company's outside 
counsel. From their perspective, the characteristics of a good consultant 
are (1) someone who will act responsibly-"they will recognize that the 
shareholders are paying their bill" and (2) someone with credibility with 
the SEC. Source #8. 
143 Source #6. 
144 Id. 
145 ld. 
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DOJ staffers as their candidates-"somebody [the staff 
lawyers] trust."146 
It is also important, though, that the company can live 
with the consultant it has chosen, especially one with a 
broad remit. It is critical, therefore, to find a consultant who 
not only will be acceptable to the SEC staff, 147 but who also 
will "get" the defendant's business. 148 The consequences of 
making a bad selection-and having to live with unhelpful 
recommendations-can be costly. 149 So, the company has to 
be "very careful" in choosing its consultant. 150 
The consultant's scope of authority is also an issue for 
negotiation. Regulated entities are generally very familiar 
with these issues and have certain priorities for the text of 
their settlements. The principal priority is flexibility in 
adopting a compliance consultant's recommendations. 151 
Companies want to be able to tweak those recommendations 
and, if necessary, seek relief from the staff. Public issuers 
may have less incentive to negotiate the details. Moreover, 
"[i]f the staff is insisting on a [compliance consultant] for 
[such a defendant], the alternatives by that point are far, far 
worse, and the company is simply at the mercy of the 
staffer."152 
146 Source #4. The selection of SEC alumni as consultants may involve 
more than backscratching. A company may select an SEC (or DOJ) alum 
as its consultant because "they know what's likely to matter to the staff." 
Source #6. 
147 Actually, the language of SEC settlements is that a consultant be 
"not unacceptable" to the staff. See supra note 77. 
148 Source #6. 
149 Dealing with consultants--even good consultants-can be 
"enormously frustrating and time-consuming." Source #1. Most 
consultants "over-investigate." Id. They are also distracting-their 
presence month after month "can cripple the Controller's office." Id. 
150 Source #6. 
151 Source #1. 
152 /d. 
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D. The Compliance Consultant In Action 
Once the consultant is appointed, he or she is likely to 
maintain contact with the SEC staff while doing the work. 
This may involve exchange of documents or other 
information. Consultants try to keep the staff informed of 
how the work is going and extract some "general feedback" 
on the adequacy of their work. 153 The nature of these 
conversations, like the form of settlement, is often 
idiosyncratic to the lawyers involved. It may also depend on 
the prior relationship, if any, between the consultant and the 
Enforcement Division staff member(s) assigned to the case. 
(Many consultants have close personal friends within the 
agency.) 
As noted above, most defense counsel believe that 
compliance consultants "milk" their clients by running up 
hours. 154 One of my sources who has served as a consultant 
conceded as much: "[when acting as a consultant,] I might as 
well do a really thorough job-no one will second-guess 
me."1ss 
When the consultant submits his or her final report, the 
SEC's response depends on who's on the staff.156 A few staff 
lawyers routinely like to "send them back and ask for more. 
[With other lawyers, the reports] just go into the drawer."157 
153 Source #6. Sometimes this feedback is very directive. "Have you 
interviewed this person? Why not? Have you looked at this issue? Why 
not?" Source #8. The staff does have influence over the tasks the 
consultant takes on. They often seem to defense counsel to be "more the 
client than the client." ld. 
154 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
155 Source #8. 
156 Source #4. 
157 ld. Source #6 disagrees with Source #4's perception. She doubts 
these reports go "into the drawer" and insists that "the staff takes these 
remedies seriously." Still, the report and recommendations would have to 
be "pretty bad" for the staff to ask for revisions or further work. A 
consultant who has maintained contact with the staff should not end up 
with that problem. Source #6. 
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And, often, of course, the staff lawyer most knowledgeable 
about the case has moved on. 158 
Interestingly, there are few repeat players serving as 
compliance consultants. 159 Rather, the work is "very spread 
out."160 And some qualified people turn down the opportunity 
to serve as consultants. "[One has to] be careful which ones 
to take-there is a penalty."161 (That is, in most SEC 
settlements, anyone serving as a consultant is disqualified 
from providing any additional services to the defendant for a 
period of two years.)162 
E. Therapeutic Sanctions Today 
Depending on whom one asks, SEC demands for 
therapeutic sanctions may be on the rise163 or may have 
peaked. 164 (At least one lawyer believes the SEC staff is 
tiring of the use of compliance consultants, especially in 
cases involving regulated entities. 165 Another believes that 
the SEC staff is "less adventuresome across-the-board" today 
than it was just three years ago.166) Still, the SEC staff 
continues to insist upon therapeutic provisions in many SEC 
cases. 
IV. STRATEGIES FOR MINIMIZING THERAPEUTIC 
SANCTIONS 
The conventional wisdom is that defendants can minimize 
both the breadth and depth of therapeutic sanctions through 
a series of corrective gestures prior to and during settlement 
discussions. Specifically, "if you can say 'management has 
158 Source #1. 
169 Source #6. 
160 ld. 
161 Id. 
162 See supra note 82. 
163 Source #6. 
164 Source #7. 
165 Source # 1. 
166 Source #7. 
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turned over, we have a new board, etc.,' [you] may avoid 
[therapeutic] terms."167 
The template (or "Bible"168) for making an argument like 
this is found in the "Seaboard Report" issued by the 
Commission in 2001.169 The Seaboard Report sets out the 
factors that the Commission will take into account in 
deciding "whether to bring an enforcement action, pursue 
reduced charges, seek lighter sanctions, or include 
mitigating language in any SEC release and/or resolution of 
enforcement actions."170 Some of the considerations set out 
in the Seaboard Report include whether the company 
conducted a thorough investigation, employed outside 
experts to conduct the investigation, adopted new internal 
control procedures, and removed the people responsible for 
the misconduct.171 
Sometimes, Seaboard-type efforts result in a settlement 
that does not include any therapeutic provisions. For 
example, Coca-Cola Company engaged in significant 
corrective activities during the course of an SEC enforcement 
proceeding in which the company was alleged to have 
engaged in a version of "channel stuffing" in order to meet its 
earnings targets. 172 Coke's management established an 
Ethics and Compliance Office to administer its Code of 
Business Conduct, created a Disclosure Committee to assist 
the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer in 
fulfilling their obligations under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
and arranged for the Board's audit committee to employ 
167 Source #1. 
168 Source #4. 
169 Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of 
Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 
44,969, 2001 SEC LEXIS 2210 (Oct. 23, 2001). 
17
° Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal 
Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and 
Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1109 (2006). 
171 /d. "Everybody knows [the Seaboard factors) by heart." Source #7. 
172 In re Coca-Cola Co., Securities Act Release No. 8569, Exchange Act 
Release No. 51,565, 2005 SEC LEXIS 861, at *4 (Apr. 18, 2005). 
HeinOnline -- 2008 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 825 2008
No. 3:793] CORPORATE THERAPEUTICS AT THE SEC 825 
experienced legal counsel. 173 The resulting settlement 
consisted simply of a cease-and-desist order. 174 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company similarly engaged in 
corrective activities following allegations that the company 
had materially misstated its international petroleum 
reserves.175 It conducted an internal investigation, reported 
its findings to the SEC, significantly enhanced its audit 
function, restructured some of its subsidiaries (including 
their boards), and improved its training programs 
worldwide. 176 The result, in addition to payment of a $120 
million civil penalty, was an agreement that Royal Dutch 
would spend a further $5 million to develop and implement a 
"comprehensive internal compliance program under the 
direction and oversight of [the defendant's] Legal 
Director . . . . Shell [further proposed] to report to the 
Commission staff within twelve months on the expenditure 
of the funds and the status ofthe compliance program."177 
In many other cases, however, significant remedial efforts 
have failed to avert the inclusion of therapeutic sanctions in 
SEC settlements. In the Millennium Partners case, the 
defendants in the period leading up to the settlement had 
created the positions of Chief Legal Officer and Chief 
Compliance Officer, and had retained an independent 
consultant whose recommendations the company had 
adopted. 178 The Enforcement Division nevertheless insisted 
on appointment of a compliance consultant approved by the 
Commission.179 
Cardinal Health, Inc., too, "hired a new chief financial 
officer, chief accounting officer and controller, and enhanced 
173 Id. at *22-23. 
174 Id. at *25. 
175 In re Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Exchange Act Release No. 
50,233, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1832, at *38 (Aug. 24, 2004). 
176 ld. at *38-40 
177 Id. at *2, 45-46. 
178 In re Millennium Partners, L.P., Securities Act Release No. 8639, 
Exchange Act Release No. 52,863, Investment Company Act Release No. 
27,172, 2005 SEC LEXIS 3078, at *21-22 (Dec. 1, 2005). 
179 ld. at *29. 
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its Finance staff to support the size and growth of Cardinal 
Health. The company also created the position of chief ethics 
and compliance officer .... "180 Here, too, however, the SEC 
staff insisted on appointment of a compliance consultant.181 
Indeed, there are many cases in which the pre-settlement 
remediation efforts of the defendant are noted-sometimes 
at length-but the SEC nevertheless insists on intrusive 
therapeutic sanctions. 182 What distinguishes these cases 
from those cases in which the defendant's remedial efforts 
are persuasive in avoiding therapeutic sanctions? The 
sources interviewed for this Article made clear that it is 
difficult to answer this question and therefore to advise their 
clients on "how much remediation is enough."183 It will not 
suffice, however, simply to claim "we've cleaned up our own 
house." Apparently, something more is needed. 
According to my sources, the challenge for defense 
lawyers is to persuade the staff that their clients' remedial 
actions have been (or are likely to be) sufficient to protect 
investors, whatever that means. One way to try to satisfy 
18° Cardinal Health Announces Resolution of SEC Investigation; U.S. 
Attorney's Office Closes Related Inquiry, PHARMA INVESTMENTS, VENTURES 
& LAw WEEKLY, Aug. 12,2007, at 684. 
181 Cardinal Health, Inc., Litigation Release No. 20,212, 2007 SEC 
LEXIS 1622, at *4 (July 26, 2007). 
182 See, e.g., In re Fidelity Mgmt. Research Co., Investment Company 
Act Release No. 28,185, 2008 SEC LEXIS 507, at *81-83, 85 (Mar. 5, 2008) 
(noting that the defendant company had disciplined approximately two 
dozen employees, changed several of its policies and procedures, and 
reorganized the management of its equity trading operations, and the 
company's parent had substantially increased its ethics office's funding for 
technology and personnel, but the staff still required the engagement of a 
compliance consultant); In re RS Inv. Mgmt., Inc., Investment Company 
Act Release No. 26,627, 2004 SEC LEXIS 2299, at *12-13, 23 (Oct. 6, 2004) 
(detailing defendant's extensive remedial efforts then concluding 
settlement with the appointment of a compliance consultant); In re PA 
Fund Mgmt. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 50,384, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 26,598, 2004 SEC LEXIS 2085, at *26, 33 (Sept. 15, 2004). 
183 
"How much remediation is enough? Great question. I think ... 
much depends on what [the Enforcement lawyers] ate for breakfast." 
Source #1. "Is the staff m.: ved by [remedial efforts]? I'm not sure .... I'm 
not sure [what] works." Source #8. 
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the SEC is to ''brag ... about how much money [the company 
has] spent" on remediation.184 Another is to preemptively 
hire an outside consultant known to the SEC.185 The key, 
though, is to build the staff's trust in the company's current 
management. 186 That means defense counsel must try to 
persuade the staff either that the case involved a "bad apple 
in a good barrel ... ; or a couple of bad apples but we have 
been able to spin off or close down that part of the 
operation."187 When those narratives are unavailable, the 
next best option is to convince the staff that "we've identified 
the problem and we've identified the solution."188 That is, 
part of the defense counsel's job is to persuade the staff that 
the problem giving rise to the violation of the securities laws 
was "relatively easy to describe and relatively easy to 
ameliorate."189 Then, counsel can make the case that there is 
no need for any additional forms of "imposed reform." 
Rather, the company should be permitted to design its own 
solution that fits its particular business. There is no need to 
hire a consultant who will "drop in from the sky."190 
If all these narratives are implausible, and the cause of 
the problem was indeed complex and systemic, then defense 
counsel has a more challenging (and possibly 
insurmountable) task. She must assure the staff that the 
client has identified and reorganized faulty systems, 
removed complicit participants in the scheme, and 
meaningfully changed the corporate culture. She must, in 
short, persuade the staff that the changes claimed are real 
and not merely atmospheric. And if that fails, she at least 
must be able to argue "(1) we take you [the SEC] seriously 
184 Source #2. 
185 Source #8. 
186 Source #7. 
187 Id. Hess and Ford caution that "bad apple" arguments like this are 
inherently suspect. In many cases, they suggest, such claims of reform are 
not to be believed. Hess & Ford, supra note 62 (manuscript at 38). 
186 Source #7. 
1s9 Id. 
19o Id. 
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and (2) we're acting responsibly and we really want to do the 
right thing. "191 
V. A WORD ON FIRING SENIOR EXECUTIVES 
Several of the sources for this Article suggested that a key 
factor in avoiding or minimizing therapeutic sanctions is a 
decision to remove top-level executives. Indeed, sometimes 
the Enforcement staff lawyers "make it clear that there will 
be no settlement unless so-and-so is fired. (This is never in 
writing.)"192 "They always want to be briefed on personnel 
changes" and they respond to these reports with informative 
body language.193 In these cases, "the staff doesn't care about 
[the details of remedial efforts]. They certainly don't care 
about corporate governance or whether someone can move 
up 10 rungs on the ISS rankings. They care about bad 
people. They signal their concerns [about those they regard 
as bad people] loud[ly] and clear[ly]-even people they're not 
willing to sue."194 
One of my sources suggested that, sometimes, replacing 
senior management officials may be a higher priority for 
defense lawyers than for the SEC staff. According to this 
lawyer, immediately after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, the settlement process often included "an unfortunate 
tendency [on the part of defense counsel] to assume the only 
way to mollify the staff was to fire senior managers whether 
they deserved it or not."195 "People are less fearful now," he 
says, and the defenestration of top managers in anticipation 
of settlement is less common than it was just two years 
ago.19s 
Still, some negotiations stall on this issue. And many 
SEC investigations are known to have resulted in the 
removal of senior executives. The AIG settlement, for 
191 Source #8. 
192 Source #1. 
1e3 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Source #7. 
196 Id. 
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example, noted the removal of the company's CEO and CFO 
as among the company's remedial measures.197 The boards 
at Putnam Investments, Hollinger International, and Royal 
Ahold, among others, are also understood to have forced the 
resignations of their CEOs and others before settling with 
the SEC. Many of these removals may in fact have been 
market-driven. On the other hand, the staffs insistence may 
have played a key role. It is impossible to know how much 
influence SEC negotiations had in any one of these cases. It 
is also impossible to know to what degree the Commission 
supports the staffs hard-ball position, given its protestations 
about not wishing to "intrude" into the board's preroga-
tives.198 
VI. AGENCY EXPERTISE 
We have seen in the foregoing sections evidence of the 
widespread use of therapeutic sanctions in SEC settlements. 
One might fairly question whether the SEC Enforcement 
staff has the expertise to craft such provisions. Lawyers 
typically have little or no organizational leadership 
experience, and this is especially true of lawyers working in 
law enforcement agencies. 199 Their inexperience can lead to 
three types of errors in prescribing guidelines for 
organizational change: (1) over-intrusiveness; (2) under-
intrusiveness; and (3) problems associated with delegating 
authority, especially to largely unaccountable outside 
compliance consultants. 
It might be one thing to expect SEC staffers to have a 
detailed understanding of the needs and limitations of SEC-
regulated entities. We find many therapeutic provisions in 
197 American Int'l Group, Inc., Litigation Release No. 19,560, 2006 
SEC LEXIS 277, at *5 (Feb. 9, 2006). 
198 See supra note 58. 
199 See, e.g., Wray & Hur, supra note 170, at 1185 ("Prosecutors know 
their way around a courtroom and a grand jury investigation but are 
unlikely to have developed meaningful expertise in the reform of highly 
regulated industries ... Business organizations are right to be leery of the 
potential consequences of well-meaning but unsophisticated advice from 
criminal prosecutors on how best to ensure legal compliance."). 
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settlements reached with such firms. Interestingly, many of 
these settlements include the appointment of compliance 
consultants/00 which may reflect either fatigue or risk 
aversion (or both) on the part of the staff. These settlements 
may also reflect special enforcement objectives-and a 
willingness to be less mindful of state law prerogatives-in 
dealing with regulated entities.201 
But what about complex non-regulated firms (public 
issuers)? Redesigning the managerial structures and 
operating rules, let alone the cultures, of such firms is a 
highly-sophisticated, time-consuming task. Redesigning the 
rules in an organization that has engaged in unlawful 
behavior is certain to be more challenging. 
Consider the types of therapeutic provisions I have 
catalogued here: new compliance structures, new accounting 
systems, new board procedures, and new training programs 
from the top to the bottom of the corporate hierarchy. Are 
these the kinds of projects that SEC lawyers can reasonably 
design? And, assuming the designs are really the product of 
the defendants' lawyers, or consultants who themselves are 
frequently lawyers, can SEC lawyers really tell the 
difference between a good corrective plan and a poor one?202 
Lawyers often misjudge reform programs because they 
overestimate the importance of "process" rather than 
200 See, e.g., In re Morgan Stanley & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 
56,634, 2007 SEC LEXIS 2331, at *10 (Oct. 10, 2007) (requiring 
engagement of a consultant to confirm that failures with respect to the 
preparation of trading confirmations have been eliminated); In re Morgan 
Stanley & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 55,726, 2007 SEC LEXIS 982, at 
*24 (May 9, 2007) (requiring engagement of a consultant to examine the 
defendant's retail order handling practices); In re A. G. Edwards & Sons, 
Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 55,692, 2007 SEC LEXIS 891, at *12 (May 
2, 2007) (requiring engagement of a consultant to examine practices 
relating to "market timing"). 
201 Source #7. According to this lawyer, the SEC staff"tend to be more 
prescriptive for regulated entities [than for public issuers]." With 
regulated entities, they are "somewhat less shy" about intervening. Id. 
202 See Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of Corporate 
Compliance With Law, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV 71, 112-13 (noting that 
neither administrative agencies nor judges are likely to be "particularly 
adept" at evaluating corporate reform proposals). 
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focusing on true behavioral change.203 They also consistently 
underestimate the full range of costs associated with the 
implementation of reform programs.204 These costs are both 
direct and indirect and include a rising level of mistrust 
within the firm, a decline in activity that is motivated by 
loyalty or reciprocity, and a decline in productivity.205 
"Reform" agendas imposed from the outside are especially 
suspect-they often breed employee cynicism and may even 
generate more deception.206 
One might argue that the SEC enforcement lawyers have 
been quite restrained in seeking (or, at least, achieving) 
therapeutic changes in the governance and management of 
public companies. As a general rule, SEC settlements have 
been less intrusive than the settlements in many private 
lawsuits.207 The extensive (and expensive) monitoring that 
sometimes occurs in criminal cases simply does not exist in 
plain-vanilla SEC civil settlements.208 
203 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Evaluation and Response to Risk by 
Lawyers and Accountants in the U.S. and the E. U.: The Appeal and Limits 
of Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 267, 
308-10 (2004); see also Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment 
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 476 
(2001) (noting that lawyers often view corporate problems as "potential 
legal claims, rather than as problems in need of systemic resolution"). 
204 Langevoort, supra note 202, at 74. 
205 
·Id. at 96. 
206 See New Arthur Andersen Study Shows How to Develop an Ethics 
Program That Works, PREVENTING BUSINESS FRAUD, May, 1999, at 1. 
I d. 
An ethics/compliance program that employees perceive as 
having been created to help guide behavior, as well as to 
establish and reinforce a shared set of company values 
rooted in the company culture, will be significantly more 
successful than a program that employees believe was 
designed primarily for purposes of compliance. A program 
that is perceived to have been developed to prevent, detect, 
and punish violations of laws and regulations, or simply to 
improve the company's image will be far less successful. 
207 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. 
208 See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 35. 
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Still, the SEC's haphazard approach to the terms of these 
settlements is problematic, as is the likelihood that the 
Enforcement staff lawyers often do not really know what 
they are asking the parties to do.209 It is not enough, 
moreover, to say that negotiated settlement terms are likely 
to be better than court-ordered sanctions210 or one-size-fits-all 
regulation. 211 Expensive and intrusive mandates such as 
those incorporated into SEC settlements should be based on 
more than uninformed or idiosyncratic preferences.212 
As I will discuss below, the Enforcement staff should be 
guided by principles consistently applied. For example, 
imposition of a consultant should be regarded as "an extreme 
measure warranted [only] when it appears that the 
[defendant] will not, or cannot, take remedial action on its 
own initiative."213 And, decisions regarding the use of 
therapeutic sanctions should be centralized and the staff 
assigned to the task should have a deep understanding of the 
complexities and nuances of organizational reform. 214 
209 As just one example, one of my sources in the Enforcement Division 
opined that management "may not mind" the presence of a compliance 
consultant. He added "that's just a guess." Source #5. 
210 See, e.g., ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY 
DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GoVERNMENT (2003) 
(describing the ineffectiveness of courts in balancing the needs of complex 
organizations). 
211 See generally Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation 
and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. 
REv. 342, 396 (2004) (noting the advantages of "designing institutions that 
rely on self-discipline and self-surveillance" rather than relying on 
government supervision). 
212 See Edward L. Rubin, Images of Organizations and Consequences 
of Regulation, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 347, 348 (2005) ("[Corporations) 
come in many different forms, and most of them are complex organizations 
that are often barely understood, even by those who spend their entire 
lives in them. To determine how these organizations are likely to respond 
to different stimuli, we need some systematic knowledge that goes beyond 
mere intuition."). 
213 In re Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., Initial Decisions Release 
No. 296, 2005 SEC LEXIS 2368, at *211 (Sept. 15, 2005). 
214 It appears, for example, that "older" companies are less adaptable 
to reform than "younger" companies. Additionally, companies with diverse 
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VII.INVESTOR PROTECTION 
In addition to questioning the SEC's expertise in 
corporate governance, one might also ask whether there is 
any value to corporate therapeutics. That is, what benefit 
accrues to a corporation and its shareholders when, as part 
of a settlement with the SEC, the company undertakes to 
change its governance practices? Recent studies have 
concluded that only a handful of corporate governance 
reforms-typically not those incorporated into SEC 
settlement documents-are demonstrably related to 
corporate performance.215 "[T]he empirical evidence [on most 
workforces are more adaptable than companies with culturally 
homogeneous workforces. Juan D. Carrillo & Denis Gromb, Cultural 
Inertia and Uniformity in Organizations, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 743, 745 
(2007). These findings would suggest that the format and emphasis of 
training programs should vary from defendant to defendant and be more 
intense in change-resistant firms. 
215 Bebchuk et al. argue that only six governance items-staggered 
boards, limits on shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority 
requirements for mergers, supermajority requirements for charter 
amendments, poison pills and golden parachutes-are demonstrably 
related to shareholder value. (Each correlates to a reduction in 
shareholder value.) Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What 
Matters in Corporate Governance?, Harvard Law School John M. Olin 
Center Discussion Paper No. 491 (2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
abstract_id=593423. Brown and Caylor confirm that the absence of a 
staggered board and the absence of poison pills are positively related to 
firm value. Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate 
Governance and Firm Valuation, 25 J. ACCT. AND PuB. POL 'y 409, 412 
(2006). They also find that five additional items-no option re-pricing 
within the past three years; option grants averaging less than 3% of the 
shares outstanding within the past three years; strong directorial 
attendance records (all directors attended at least 75% of the meetings or 
had a valid excuse for non-attendance); governance guidelines in the 
annual proxy statement; and stock ownership requirements for directors-
are "key drivers" of firm valuation. Id. at 411. 
In a related paper, Brown and Caylor identifY five items that are 
significantly and positively related to both return on assets (ROA) and 
return on equity (ROE): a nominating committee comprised solely of 
independent outside directors; lack of authorization to issue blank check 
preferred stock; non-employees (e.g., outside directors) do not participate 
in company pension plans; at least one member of the board has 
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governance reforms'] correlation with shareholder value is 
limited or mixed or both, and does not prove decisively that 
they cause increases in value."216 
There are also grave doubts whether many corporate 
compliance programs are effective in transforming corporate 
cultures. Here, too, recent studies conclude that "little 
evidence exists to support [the] assumption that internal 
compliance structures reduce the incidence of prohibited 
conduct within organizations."217 Indeed, the "most recent 
and methodologically sound studies [find] no significant 
correlation between the most widely used internal 
compliance structures and reduced organizational miscon-
duct."218 In other words, most compliance programs, 
especially those endorsed by government regulators, may be 
"largely window -dressing. "219 
If these programs were cost-free, or even if they were 
costly but otherwise harmless, it might not matter. But we 
now understand that therapeutic sanctions are not free and 
not harmless. As noted above, governance interventions can 
have unintended and even harmful consequences.220 And, 
unfortunately, no one to date has done a thoughtful cost-
benefit analysis of the therapeutic sanctions the SEC 
participated in an ISS-accredited director education program; and average 
options granted in the past three years as a percentage of shares 
outstanding did not exceed three percent. Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus 
D. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Operating Performance (2007), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1072384. 
216 Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too, 22 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 251, 303 (2005). See also Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Good 
Governance and the Misleading Myths of Bad Metrics, 18 AcAD. OF MGMT. 
EXEC. No. 1, at 108 (2004) (many so-called "reforms" are based on "Wall 
Street superstitions" and "cliches and myths, rather than on genuine 
research"). 
217 Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of 
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASHU. L.Q. 487,491 (2003). 
218 Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the 
Principal-Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571, 591 (2005). 
219 Krawiec, supra note 217, at 513. 
220 See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
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employs.221 Nevertheless, the Enforcement staff keeps 
insisting upon these sanctions, as if "more board meetings, 
more audit committee meetings, longer meetings, longer 
meetings still, more certifications, more internal controls, 
new, often untried documentation of those controls, added 
auditing devices, beefed up gatekeepers, new gatekeepers, 
[etc.]"222 were proven remedies for corporate wrongdoing. 
They are not. 
VIII.A CAUTIONARY TALE 
In thinking about the problems presented by therapeutic 
sanctions, consider the story of Bristol-Myers Squibb. In 
2004, the company was charged by the SEC with falsifying 
its financial statements through mechanisms including 
"channel-stuffing'' and other manipulative accounting 
devices.223 In settling the case, the company agreed to 
various remedial undertakings, including "the appointment 
of an independent advisor to review, assess, and monitor 
Bristol-Myers' accounting practices."224 The "advisor" was a 
former U.S. Attomey and a retired federal judge who pressed 
the company to hire new senior financial executives, create 
the position of chief compliance officer, and "adoptD a 
healthy new attitude toward being a good corporate 
citizen."225 Nevertheless, the company soon found itself in 
trouble for inflating its drug prices on bills to insurers and 
government agencies. Then, it got into even deeper trouble 
for engineering (and then lying about) a secret non-compete 
221 See infra Part IX, SEC Recommendation #2. 
222 Douglas M. Branson, Too Many Bells? Too Many Whistles? 
Corporate Governance in the Post·Enron, Post-WorldCom Era, 58 S.C. L. 
REV. 65, 66 (2006). 
223 Press Release, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company Agrees to Pay $150 
Million to Settle Fraud Charges, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-
105.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2008). 
224 Id. 
225 Sue Reisinger, Doctor's Orders, CORP. CsL., Oct. 1, 2007, available 
at http://www .law .com/jsp/cc/PubArticleFriendlyCC .j sp ?id=900005491 068. 
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agreement with another drug company to enhance its 
position in the generic drug market. 226 
Even though, unlike most consultants, the Bristol-Myers 
advisor had prior experience as a monitor,227 and even 
though he had spent thirty-seven months on the job, the 
Bristol-Myers advisor was "stunned" by these 
developments.228 Perhaps this is explained by the fact that, 
by the time the company was deeply in trouble, the advisor 
was eighty-seven years old. Or, perhaps it is explained by 
the mindset with which the advisor approached his work: 
"[Judge] Lacey said he found the work exhilarating. He 
hadn't wielded this much power in years. He attended 
executive committee meetings, talked with any individual he 
chose, and sent a team of [his law firm colleagues] to attend 
dozens of other meetings and report back to him."229 
Even though this story is not typical of SEC civil 
enforcement actions,230 it illustrates some of the problems of 
therapeutic interventions: (1) consultants are often selected 
more for who they know than what they know; (2) 
consultants paid by the hour (as most of them are) have both 
the opportunity and motive to run up large bills without 
regard to whether their work is valuable to the company; 
and (3) to make their work look meaningful, consultants 
have to unearth facts and make recommendations. However, 
to have any lasting impact on the company, they must work 
closely with senior management and develop strong ties of 
trust. The first course of action may be costly and fruitless. 
The second may make the consultant so comfortable that he 
becomes ineffective in bringing about change. 
The Bristol-Myers Squibb case also suggests another 
important lesson. The process of selecting consultants and 
"advisors" should be undertaken with care. The current 





230 All three of the allegations against Bristol-Myers Squibb included 
Department of Justice charges of criminal violations. 
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unfortunately, like a protection racket. It ultimately may 
discredit the Commission and its staff. Or, as seems likely to 
occur with the Department of Justice, it may invite 
legislative intervention. 231 
IX. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This Article has examined the use by the SEC of 
therapeutic sanctions in civil enforcement actions. With 
surprising frequency, we have found Enforcement Division 
staff lawyers in these actions negotiating for removal of 
senior executives, alteration of board practices, new 
reporting relationships, delegation of key decisions to 
consultants, and significant expenditures of shareholders' 
funds. 
Any discussion of the use of therapeutic sanctions has to 
take place in a larger context. The settlement of SEC 
charges involves a balancing of many factors: the nature of 
the charges (fraud or non-fraud); the pendency of other 
actions (criminal and civil); the burdens of a cease-and-desist 
order versus the burdens of an injunction; the size of the civil 
penalty; the reaction of the market and stakeholders; and 
the necessity of a speedy resolution, among others. No one 
factor will drive every settlement. Right now, however, the 
Enforcement staff seems to be free-lancing its way through 
discussions of governance and management issues. The 
judgments of boards of directors are being displaced by those 
of lawyers with little appreciation for how businesses grow. 
The SEC should give some serious thought to the issues 
raised by the persistent use of therapeutic sanctions. 
Recognizing the value of "clarity, consistency, and 
predictability" in sanctioning policy,232 the Commission 
should adopt a set of written guidelines governing the use of 
therapeutic sanctions. These guidelines should include the 
following general provisions: 
231 See Pedro Ruz Gutierrez, Democrats Moue to Regulate Corporate 
Monitors, LAW.COM, July 15, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp? 
id=1202422975044. 
232 Statement Concerning Financial Penalties, supra note 23. 
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(1) as a general rule, therapeutic sanctions should be 
included in a settlement only where supported by clear and 
convincing evidence that intervention is needed-the default 
position for prospective relief should be non-intervention; 
(2) the Enforcement Division ought not seek therapeutic 
sanctions unless that demand is authorized in advance by 
the Commission; 
(3)the Enforcement Division should require the creation 
of new board practices, governance arrangements, and 
management structures only with the active involvement of 
the independent members of the defendant's board; 
( 4) compliance consultants should be used sparingly and 
only where it is clear that the problem is a result of (a) 
systemic, multi-location, or multi-unit failures requiring 
extensive oversight and rehabilitation and (b) unwillingness 
or inability of management to address the systemic, multi-
location or multi-unit problem; 
(5) the scope of work for compliance consultants should be 
carefully and narrowly defined in advance, and include a 
good-faith estimate of the time required to complete the 
work; 
(6)the Enforcement Division should insist upon budgets 
and fee caps for compliance consultants-the open-ended 
arrangements now in place encourage abuse and over-billing. 
In addition to written sanction guidelines, the SEC 
should consider the following recommendations: 
(1) the SEC staff should centralize its knowledge and 
institutional memory concerning the use of therapeutic 
sanctions; 
(2)the Government Accountability Office (GAO) should 
conduct a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of the SEC's 
recent use of therapeutic sanctions in civil cases and the 
findings of this report should (a) be made public and (b) 
inform all future settlement negotiations; 
(3) Enforcement Division lawyers should receive direction 
and training on the appropriate use of therapeutic sanctions, 
with periodic updates on emerging knowledge about 
corporate governance practices and the efficacy of compliance 
programs; 
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( 4) the SEC staff should identify a cadre of professional 
compliance consultants rather than leaving it to defendants 
to select whomever they wish. The current set-up ensures 
that many first-time consultants re-invent the wheel. There 
is also an appearance of impropriety involved in the 
consistent appointment of compliance consultants who are 
SEC alumni; 
(5) the SEC should commission a study of alternatives to 
therapeutic sanctions. These might include disclosure-based 
alternatives (periodic reporting of progress toward 
governance reform), collaborative engagement between the 
SEC staff and companies' audit committees, periodic 
unannounced SEC "examinations" of companies with non-
compliance histories, or other processes designed to enhance 
adherence to the rule of law; 
(6)the SEC should insist upon transparency regarding 
the use of compliance consultants in settled cases; at a 
minimum, their identity and a report of their annual and 
total compensation should be available to the public; 
(7) compliance consultants should be required to submit 
an "after-action" report to the SEC staff after each 
engagement, detailing "lessons learned;" 
(8)the performance of compliance consultants should be 
measured by common metrics; their reports should be 
produced "in a form that makes it possible to compare 
experiences across firms."233 
At a more fundamental level, the Commission should 
consider whether the use of its enforcement powers to 
supplant the prerogatives of corporate boards and those who 
elect them is either legitimate or desirable. This is not a new 
question. 234 
X. CONCLUSION 
Roberta Karmel recently suggested that board 
composition and structure, and corporate governance 
233 Hess & Ford, supra note 62, manuscript at 51. 
234 See generally ROBERTA 8. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: 
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. CORPORATE AMERICA (1982). 
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generally, are issues that "the SEC has been angling to 
regulate for some time. "23s She had in mind the new 
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but might as easily 
have pointed to the actions of the Enforcement Division in 
resolving civil cases with therapeutic settlements. 
This Article examines the SEC's use of therapeutic 
settlements, both with regulated entities and with public 
companies. It questions the effectiveness of these 
settlements and the role of the SEC in shaping corporate 
governance norms. 
235 Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0 . Douglas-
The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate 
Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L . 79, 81 (2005). 
